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THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL GROUNDS FOR, AND THE
INFLUENCE OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION ON, THE DEMAND OF
THE ALBANIANS OF KOSOVO FOR INDEPENDENCE
HAJRED1N KuQi*
INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was one of the greatest and
most difficult processes in Europe after the Cold War. One part of the
process of dissolution concluded with the Dayton Peace Accords, but the
other, more difficult part, Kosovo, has long remained unresolved. Kosovo
was the main problem in the former Yugoslavia, and yet it was ignored for
a long time. The situation in Kosovo, particularly in recent years, was not
merely a large Albanian-Serbian problem but also an international one.
Kosovo, in 1999, was the greatest problem in the international arena, one of
the greatest problems since the Second World War, and a test of the international community's problem-solving ability after the Cold War.
The purpose of this paper is to give a brief reflection on Kosovo, her
people, and the roots of this problem. In particular, it attempts to elaborate
on the right of the Albanian people of Kosovo to self-determination according to international standards viewed from legal, political, and security
perspectives. In Part I, I shall present briefly Kosovo and her people from a
historical, geographical, and geostrategic perspective. The reason for this
presentation is to document the historical, demographic, and strategic interests of Albanians, who have a natural right to self-determination and independence. In Part II, I examine the position of Kosovo on the disintegration
of the Former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's dissolution was the most appropriate moment for the Albanians of Kosovo to realize their historical aspirations and to reorient according to a Western perspective. In Part III, I argue
for the right of Kosovar Albanians to self-determination under international
law. International theory and practice concerning the right of peoples to
self-determination in the time after the Cold War have special application
to the case of Kosovo. In Part IV, I argue that there are legal and political
bases for independence from the standpoint of regional security. In contrast
to typical thinking on the matter, based on the history of Kosovo, nonrec*
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ognition of Kosovar independence would in fact destabilize the region, and
has historically proven dangerous. In Part V, I examine what influence the
actual situation should have on the final status of Kosovo.
I.

A BRIEF

OVERVIEW OF KOSOVO

Kosovo is situated in the southwestern part of the Balkans. It is one of
the smallest countries of Europe, both territorially and population-wise.
Kosovo occupies a central geographical position on the Balkan Peninsula.
Kosovo's territory, albeit relatively small, has always been of great geographical significance and geostrategic importance. Kosovo borders Albania and always played a central role in historical efforts to safeguard and
integrate the entire national territory in the Balkans. The border between
Kosovo and Albania runs through the highest mountain regions and is a
nonethnic boundary, with territories inhabited by similar populations on
each side. Kosovo's present borders are the product of political history and
topography. 1 Kosovo's homogeneous ethnic structure comprises an overwhelming majority of Albanians, with the remainder being, inter alia,
Serbs, Turks, Bosnians, and Romanians.
The ancient history of Kosovo and Kosovar Albanians cannot be
viewed in isolation from Albania's history. The Albanian people of Kosovo
constitute one of Europe's oldest ethnic populations. No other people are
more "connected" to the history of the Balkans. The history of the Balkans
cannot be understood completely without considering the history of the
2
Albanians of Kosovo.
Ethnic Albanians are descendants of the Illyrians, who lived in what
now are the territories of Albania, Kosovo, and a large part of the former
Yugoslavia. Kosovo is a part of the land once populated by the Dardans, an
3
Illyrian tribe.
For the greater part of the twentieth century, the Albanians of Kosovo
spoke their own unique Albanian language, which used a Latin alphabet
modified in November 1908 at the pan-Albanian Conference in Manastir
(now the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Today, Albanians in
both Kosovo and Albania use the version of the alphabet that was standardized and unified in 1972. Social scientists have confirmed the Illyrian origins of the Albanians and their language. For example, author Radoslav
Katii6 of the former Yugoslavia, referring to the territory in which the
1. See NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY xxxv (1998).

2. Id. at xxxvi.
3. Aleksander Stipcevic, The Question of Illyrian-Albanian Continuity and its Political Topicality Today, 4 KOSOVA 11, 13 (1994).
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Albanian language developed from Illyria, wrote, "[t]his area coincides
roughly with the modem state of Albania and extends over the border into
4
Yugoslav and Greek territory."
At the crossroads of the Balkan Wars, the Albanian state included
only half of the Albanian people and included less than half of lands comprising an Albanian majority. Since that point, Albanians living in
neighboring states have faced military police regimes and policies of genocide, expropriation, and expulsion. Unfortunately, some of the major regional powers justified these actions more than once. By the end of the
Balkan Wars, the position of the Albanians was described by the author
Castellan as follows: "Once again the [Albanian] people was left to anarchy
'5
and foreign interventions.
Many native and foreign authors have described the regrettable fate
that Albanians and Kosovars have met through the centuries. Even Serbian
academics have empathized. For example, Dedijer wrote, "[i]t would seem
that never has any country, and the interests of any people, been dealt with
so shamefully in peace conference as is the case with the people of
6
Kosovo."
From an Albanian perspective, the Serbs have been seen as occupiers
and colonizers. Following the Serbian occupation in 1912, Kosovo became
a land of terrible suffering for the Albanian people, whose very existence
was threatened. 7 Kosovo and its Albanian population were pillars of national resistance in the former Yugoslavia.
Most of the Albanians of Kosovo practice one of two dominant religions-Islam (the majority) and Catholicism (the minority). Additionally, a
very small number practices Greek Orthodoxy. No Albanian political
movement ever has been defined by religion. If we survey the past, we can
find many instances of mixed religious life. In recent years, Kosovar Albanians have been politically mobilized in many directions, but religion has
never played a role. 8
For hundreds of years, many battles and wars have taken place in
Kosovo. During the last century, a lot of these have been ethnic conflicts

4.

RADOSLAV KATIC(I,

5.

GEORGES CASTELLAN, HISTORY OF THE BALKANS: FROM MOHAMMED THE CONQUEROR TO

ANCIENT LANGUAGES OF THE BALKANS 185 (1976).

STALIN 385 (Nicholas Bradley trans., 1992).
6.

VLADIMIR DEDIJER, JUGOSLAVIJA OD VERSALJA DO PARIZA [YUGOSLAVIA FROM VERSAILLES

TO PARIS] 24 (Belgrade 1947).
7. Zcjnullah Gruda, E drejta e vetevendosjes se popujve [The Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination], E DREJTA [LAW: J. JURIDICIAL & SOC. ISSUES), at 14 (Univ. Kosovo L. Sch. publish.,
Apr.-June 1996).
8. MALCOLM, supra note 1, at xxviii.
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between Albanians and Serbs. The history of relations between Albanians
and Serbs in Kosovo is marked by conflict. 9
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was an opportune moment
for the people of Kosovo to realize their legitimate aspirations for selfdetermination. Interethnic tensions rose even further, and mistrust between
Serbs and Albanians deepened. The roots of this conflict are deep and date
from the time Serbia occupied Kosovo. 10
II.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE POSITION

OF Kosovo
The creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted from major geopolitical changes. 1I Yugoslavia was a country created by the international
community.12 After the death of the former Yugoslav leader Tito, the federal center began to fall, gradually at first, but rapidly after 1987.13
Problematic relations among the nations were always present in the
former Yugoslavia. 14 A principal cause of this was the official equal status
of Croats and Serbs, which caused each group always to vie for dominance
in the federation. 15 The Serbs were more successful at this game, and Serbian hegemony dominated as a result. 16 Even so, because of the absence of
a single unifying factor among the nations incorporated into the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY"), the SFRY could survive only if
17
Serbian domination was successful and Serbian hegemony held sway.
The political slogan of "brotherhood and unity," which became enshrined
in Yugoslavia's Constitution, 18 came to define relations across the supranational Federation. But this idea also characterized national identity in the
final phase of socialism.19

9. Id. at xxix.
10.

SABRINA P. RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA,

1962-1991, at 193

(1992).
11. Dusko Sekulic, The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia,3 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 165, 169 (1997).
12. Lord David Owen, The Break-up of Yugoslavia: Its International Aspects, 3 INT'L
PEACEKEEPING 34, 34 (1996).
13. RAMET, supra note 10, at 34.
14. Vesna V. Godina, The Outbreak of Nationalism on Forner Yugoslav Territory: A Historical
Perspectiveon the Problem of SupranationalIdentity, 4 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 409, 411 (1998).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at412.
Id. at413.
Id. at413-17.
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The conflicts throughout the 1990s in former Yugoslavia resulted
20
from the rise of nationalist identity and the fall of supranational identity.
The explosion of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia was a provocative
phenomenon with political consequences (the war) and also raised various
theoretical and analytical issues.
The former Yugoslavia entered the final phase of her dissolution in the
middle of 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia empowered their Declaration of
Independence and the Yugoslav Peoples Army intervened to defend the
2 1
country's territorial integrity.
The Albanian-Serbian conflict, although not a decisive factor in the
unraveling of the multinational federation of Yugoslavia, was nevertheless
the initial and structural factor in that unraveling. 22 April 25, 1987, was the
date of self-destruction for the former Yugoslavia and the date when war
preparations formally were made. 23 The first psychological preparation and
promotion of the war happened in Kosovo Field, where hysteria resulted in
the dream of creating a Greater Serbia. On this date, Milosevic gave Serbs
'24
the great promise that "no one will defeat you."
When the dissolution of former Yugoslavia began, it was plain that
Serbia intended to implement its nationalist program for a Greater Serbia
(especially after 1989), and its centralist tendencies became more visible
than ever before. 25 Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker held a similar view. Addressing the U.N. Security Council on behalf of the United
States on September 25, 1991, the date of passage of the U.N. arms embargo against former Yugoslavia, 26 Mr. Baker declared:
The apparent objective of the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military working in tandem is to create a "small Yugoslavia" or a "greater
Serbia", which would exclude Slovenia and a rump Croatia. This new
entity would be based on the kind of repression
which Serbian authori27
ties have exercised in Kosovo for several years.
Since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, all the parties have
tended to rewrite history, placing themselves in the finest light and their

20. Id at 420.
21. Snezana Trifunovska, Preventive Peacekeepingand the Case ofthe Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia,4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 2, 2 (1997).
22. 1 GAZMENDZAJMI, COLLECTED WORKS 121 (AASHK, Pristina 1997).
23. MARK ALMOND, EUROPE'S BACKYARD WAR: THE WAR IN THE BALKANS 9 (1994).

24. DARKO HUDELIST, Kosovo: BITKA 13EZ ILUZIJA 34-37 (1989).
25.

See JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, NATIONS IN TURMOIL: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN EASTERN

EUROPE 125-36 (1993)26. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
27. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 59, U.N. Doe. S/PV.3009 (1991).
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opponents in the worst. 28 Personalities, as always, played an important role,
and certain players who exploited the communist climate and lack of democracy emerged. In 1990, Serbia, led by Milosevic, regained control over
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina, making them her satellites and thus
controlling the votes of four out of the former Yugoslavia's eight presidents. Milosevic and Serbia's ability to block the work of this Presidency
was a symptom of the former Yugoslavia's disintegration. In May 1991,
Milosevic and Serbia blocked the rotation of the Presidency, which marked
29
the conclusion of the former Yugoslavia's institutional destruction.
The unilateral changes in the constitutional status of Kosovo and Vojvodina marked the start of a violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The
balance of forces among the federal units of the former Yugoslavia
30
changed radically, and Serbia pressed forth its hegemony.
The final act of preparing Serbia for war occurred in December 1990,
when the Milosevic regime, without the knowledge of the Central Bank,
took two billion dollars' worth of Yugoslav dinars. Thus, all the resources
of the Central Bank, including foreign currency, gold, and other valuables,
31
were used to finance the war.
When open war began in Croatia (September 1991) and Bosnia and
Herzegovina (March-April 1992), the former Yugoslav army came out
openly on the side of the Serbs, supporting the creation of a Greater
Serbia.32

Tihomir Loza observed that "[firom the beginning of the 1980s, the
Kosovo Serb movement used a wide range of racist arguments to fuel antiAlbanian sentiment. ' 33 The myth of Kosovo has always been a principal
part of the Serbian psyche. It has represented a historical, quasi-historical,
and poetic consciousness of the medieval Serbian state, which stood opposed to the imperial Ottoman Empire. Serbia has raised the myth of the
Battle of Kosovo every time it has gone to war. Serbs, in Kosovo, saw their
history and their present as heroic and missionary-a matter of pride, de34
monization, and victimization.
The efforts of Slovenia and Croatia to gain independence (MarchJune 1991), of Macedonia and Kosovo (September 1991), and of Bosnia
28. David E. Goodlett, History and NationalityAmong Former Yugoslavs, 6 EUR. SECURITY 53,
53 (1997).
29. EDWARD R. RICCIUTI, WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA: THE BREAKUP OF A NATION 26-27 (1993).
30. Tihomir Loza, Kosovo Albanians Closing the Ranks, 5 TRANSITIONS 16, 25 (1998).
31. ALMOND, supra note 23, at 15.
32. JAMES Gow, LEGITIMACY AND THE MILITARY: THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 142 (1992),
33. Loza, supra note 30, at 23.
34. Warren Zimmerniann, The Demons ofKosovo, NAT'L INT., Summer 1998, at 3, 3.
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and Herzegovina (March-April 1992) all were made in response to aggressive behavior by Serbia. The Slovenes and Croats wished to leave the federation and thus evade Serbian influence. Neither Bosnia nor Macedonia
had a clear strategy at that time. In contrast, Serbia wished to protect her
political and economic control of a strong federation and her dominant role
35
in Yugoslav society.
The international community did not understand Serbia and Milosevic's intention in time. The United States, the European Union, and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") initially
supported keeping federation territory in tact, which doubtless strengthened
Milosevic's policy. The international community failed to demand negotiations. Eventually, international support for the independence of Slovenia
36
and Croatia did materialize.
On September 19, 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
777, which provided:
[T]he state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist ....[T]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore [the Security Council] recommends to the General
Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
37
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations.
Likewise, the International Monetary Fund, in its Declaration of December 15, 1992, stressed that "[Yugoslavia] has ceased to exist and has
therefore ceased to be a member of the IMF."'38 At the same time, the executive directors of the World Bank said that Yugoslavia had ceased to
exist. 39 The Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia ("Badinter Commission") also concluded that the dissolution that began
40
in November 1991 was complete and that the SFRY no longer existed.
All the evils that occurred during or after the dissolution of former
Yugoslavia-civilian massacres, the destruction of whole cities and dwell-

35. See BUGAJSKI, supra note 25, at 101-09.
36. ALAN F. FOGELQUIST, HANDBOOK OF FACTS ON THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA:
INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 12-13 (1993).
37. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992).
38. Malcolm N. Shaw, State Succession Revisited, in 5 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 53 (1994)
(citing Press Release No. 92/92, International Monetary Fund (Dec. 23, 1992)).
39. Id (citing Press Release No. 93/S43, World Bank (Feb. 26, 1993)).
40. See Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration Commission of the Pence Conference on Yugoslavia
(July 4, 1992) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion No. 8], reprintedin YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS:
FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 634, 636 (SNE2ANA TRIFUNOVSKA ed., 1994).

...
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ing places, and the great manipulation -of the media-were also present in
41
the Balkan wars.
When even the Slav peoples themselves exited the former Yugoslavia,
the Albanians of Kosovo no longer had any reason to remain inside the
newly created Serbia and Montenegro. Albanians were not thankful for and
did not value the leadership of Belgrade. Interethnic tensions had been high
in Kosovo over the years but deepened further after the former Yugoslavia's dissolution. 42 The University of Pristina's own Gazmend Zajmi
stressed that "[t]he Albanian people in former Yugoslavia have the least
reason to mourn the dissolution of the former Yugoslav federation or to be
'43
satisfied with the manner of the dissolution of this federation.
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the creation of new circumstances in that territory created an opportune moment for a political
movement aimed at realizing the historic, legitimate rights of the Albanians
of Kosovo.
III. THE RIGHT OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Treatment of Kosovo's Right to Self-Determinationat the Time of the
Dissolutionof the FSRY

A.

The right to national self-determination is very attractive because it
represents values of democracy and the right of a people to live according
to their culture. 44 The principle of self-determination is one of the most
important principles of modem international law. It is also one of the most
difficult principles to apply, as is evident by the great individual and national efforts that have been made. It is a cause of wars and of peace in
many regions and for many countries and peoples. Self-determination was
dreamed of for centuries, became a reality after the Second World War, and
has since undergone several phases. Until 1989-1990, this right was quite
restricted and it was thought to belong only to countries under colonialism.
But this interpretation of the Declaration of 197045 was not based on practical or theoretical considerations because even outside the context of colo-

41.
42.
43.
44.

Tim Judah, The Serbs and Their Myth, 4 TRANSITIONS 84 (1998).
RAMET, supra note 10, at 34.
ZAJMi, supra note 22, at 83.
See Michael Freeman, National Self-Determination, Peace and Human Rights, 10 PEACE REV.

157, 162 (1998).
45- Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-

operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
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nial countries, opportunities and demands for the realization of this fundamental right existed.
The failure of communism opened the possibility of extending this international principle via new approaches and methods of implementation.
Countries previously united, whether by free will or by force, now sought
independence. Even those countries whose constitutions did not envisage
such a right were enabled to realize it. However, this right was not realized
in a uniform manner according to international standards, but rather depended on the country, circumstances, and interethnic tension. Thus, several states achieved the right to self-determination in a calm and stable way,
as was the case with the former Czechoslovakia. Other states did so with
terrible violence, as was the case with the former Soviet Union and especially the former Yugoslavia.
After the end of the Cold War, the international community attempted
to give some structure to the conditions and manner of realizing the right to
self-determination. The international community saw the principle of selfdetermination as a response to the dissolution of communist states. Thus,
the EU (then the European Community) was the first to involve itself in
this context. The right to self-determination (the expression of free will),
according to the European Union, was considered to belong only to those
who had lived inside one of the federal-type republics. Other ethnicities
were denied the right to expression of free will and the creation of their
own state. The EU's stance was sanctioned by the Badinter Commission 46
and the U.N. Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States
47
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the right to self-determination and possible secession was recognized for those ethnicities that enjoyed this right expressly according to
their constitutions (as in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) or those
who enjoyed an "advanced status" (a type of republic) within communist
federations. "Constitutional dissolution" was legitimized in this way, based

46. See Opinion No. I of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
(Nov. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion No. ], reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH
DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 415; Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Jan. 11, 1992) lhercinafter Badinter Opinion No. 21, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 474; Opinion No. 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Jan It, 1992), reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS,
supro note 40, at 479; Badinter Opinion No. 8, supra note 40; Opinion No. II of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (July 16, 1993), reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH
DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 1017.
47. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the "Guidelines on the Recognition
of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992).
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entirely on the communist interpretation or recognition of the principle of
48
self-determination.
Even though in its initial opinion of November 1991 the Badinter
Commission found that "[t]he constitutional provisions are mere facts," 49
in practice the EU accepted the facts as laid down by the communist model
in those constitutions.
Based on this, certain legal, political, and dogmatic constitutional concepts were legitimized simply by reference to whatever form or manner of
solution the communists had chosen to determine national questions. These
concepts were adopted despite the fact that in those systems, the communist party had decided arbitrarily what would be a republic, autonomous
republic, or federal ethnicity, and what would be a nation, nationality, or
national minority. It is well known that the ideas of Stalin and Lenin regarding the "type of classes" to whom the right to self-determination be50
longs has predominated in the communist systems.
Unfortunately, Kosovo, before the Cold War, had the framework of a
communist state. Consequently, even though on the former Yugoslavia's
dissolution Kosovo desired to win the right to self-determination, the communist measures that had been laid down years previously and far from the
actual situation and will of the Kosovars were applied. From these policies,
the nonrecognition of the right of the Albanians of Kosovo to selfdetermination and independence resulted. These policies of the EU were
also the basis for evaluating other states and organizations.
Documents of the EU from that time show that it viewed this principle
of technical constitutional interpretation as being in complete accord with
principles of justice, democracy, human rights, and the rights of minorities.
Thus, the EU proposed that a special status should be accorded to those
ethnicities to whom the right of independence did not belong. 51 This was
the proposal for Kosovo.
B.

The Legal and PoliticalBasisfor the Self-DeterminationofKosovo

After the division of the Albanian nation in 1912-1913, at least half of
the Albanian nation and half of the autochthonous territories populated
overwhelmingly by Albanians were forced to live outside the new Albanian
48. Antonio Cassese, Self-Deternination of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 131, 134-41 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994).
49. See Badinter Opinion No. 1, supra note 46, at 416.
50. Vladimir Ibler, Pravo naroda na samoodredenjeizloupotreba tog prava [The Right of People
to Self-Determination and the Abuse of this Right], 29 POLIrIECKA MISAO 53-55 (1992).
51. See Badinter Opinion No. 2, supra note 46, at 474-75.
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state. The Albanians of Kosovo have existed in a separated nation since
that time.
From the time of the geopolitical division of Kosovo from Albania,
the people of Kosovo have aspired to have their own identity, equality, and
national unity.
During the whole time that the Albanians lived under the former
Yugoslavia, their treatment was as a national minority, even though, since
the founding of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, they were numerically
greater than any one of the founders of this kingdom.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, under the communist system of former Yugoslavia, the legal and political status of Kosovo changed
several times. Kosovo proceeded through various forms of political and
territorial autonomy in 1946, 1963, and 1974. In 1974, a wide-ranging
autonomy from Belgrade was secured with broad powers similar to those of
the former socialist republics. However, the right of secession was not
guaranteed, just as it was not guaranteed to other federal units. In the 1974
Constitution, the SFRY was considered as a joint state comprised of equal
nations, nationalities, republics, and the autonomous regions of Kosovo and
52
Vojvodina.
53
In the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo had its own identity and territory
and was acknowledged in the field of international relations.5 4 Kosovo was
authorized to establish the National Bank 55 and to raise taxes. 56 In addition
to these powers, Kosovo had an equal right to be present in all the organs
57
of the Federation, including the former Federal Presidency.
At the time of the fall of communism and dissolution of the FSRY,
Kosovo began to build its own new identity. On the legal and political side,
this started on July 2, 1990, when the Kosovar Parliament issued a Constitutional Declaration, which demanded that Kosovo and its majority population be treated equally with others in the former Yugoslavia. 58 Following

52. See SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. pmbl., arts. 1, 5 (1974), reprintedin
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 224-26.
53. Id. at art. 5, reprintedin YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 226.
54. Id. at art. 271, reprintedin THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA 217 (Dragoljub Duroviced ed., Marko Pavii6 trans., 1974) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION
OF THE SFRY]. The texts of these agreements and accompanying acts were published in the Official
Newspaper of Kosovo, No. 12/72, 3/77 and 34/78.
55.

SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 262, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF

THE SFRY, supra note 54, at 212.
56. Id. at art. 265, reprintedin CONSTITUTION OF THE SFRY, supra note 54, at 214.
57. Id. at art. 321, reprintedin CONSTITUTION OF THE SFRY, supra note 54, at 260.
58. PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (2002); see
also Constitutional Declaration, RILINDJE [RENAISSANCE], July 3, 1990, at 1.
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this, on September 7, 1990, -the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo,
which was based on the principle of self-determination and sovereign
equality, was approved. 59 One year later, between September 26, 1991, and
September 30, 1991, the majority population of Kosovo, the Albanians, by
referendum took their greatest step to that date toward self-determination
and expression of free will.60
At that time, in addition to these formal judicial acts, which were recognized by no country except Albania, the legal representatives of Kosovo
undertook certain other actions toward building an independent life and
international recognition of their will. Thus, there was Kosovo's request for
international recognition on December 21, 1991, a few days after the European Union formally recognized that the former Yugoslavia had ceased to
exist and that the new states should apply for membership. These requests
and others of the Kosovars for independence at the start of the 1990s were
not met with a positive response. Some argue that this nonrecognition occurred as a result of the failure to fulfill the basic international criterion for
independence-namely, the effective control of the territory of Kosovo by
the majority population and its government at the time of the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia. 6 1 The international community's position on the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia legitimized this criterion of effective
control or inability to control. This position was based not so much on legal
and moral arguments as on geostrategic and political ones-specifically,
the need to stop the violence and the explosion of the conflict into
62
neighboring states.
The international community would have to take into account the rise
and fall of the former Yugoslavia, her structure, and her constituent parts.
Yet, the former Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and no republic recognized
her continuation, not even the so-called Yugoslavia formed in 1992. As
mentioned already, the U.N., EU, and World Bank all accepted this fact. In
fact, no one expressed their free will by referendum for union with or entry
into this new state. The Kosovar Albanians have not taken part, by any
legal or political act, in the structures and institutions of the remnant Yugoslavia. They plainly have severed their lives, institutions, and future from it.
59. RADAN, supro note 58, at 199; see also REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO CONST., Sept. 7, 1990, DIELLI
[THE SUN], Zagreb 1990.
60. Bujar Bukoshi, Serbia's Next Victim, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1992, at A23 (referring to the
referendum); see also Results of the Referendum of September 26-30, 1991, BUJKU [THE FARMERI,
Pristina Oct. 1, 1991, at 1-3.
61. Recognition of States, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 480 (A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds.,
1992).
62. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 586-89 (1992).
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Kosovo and her majority population historically have represented a
special ethnic and linguistic collection. They also inhabited a compact territory. Thus, they had a clear and visible national identity. The national identity, territorial compactness, and absolute majority in Kosovo were historic
features of the Albanians in this land. From legal and constitutional points
of view, Kosovo's independence after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia does not represent the creation, alteration, or elimination of borders,
because Kosovo had its own unviolated borders that were accepted accord63
ing to the former Yugoslavia.
Additionally, after the Balkan wars in 1912, Serbia violently annexed
Kosovo by occupation. In Kosovo during the last eighty-seven years, Serbia's treatment of the Albanian people was oppressive and genocidal. This
was especially notable during the final war of 1998-1999. All of this gives
Kosovo and the Albanian people the right to and the desire for independence. Furthermore, according to a well-known international principle, Serbia, by the violent treatment it used, loses the right to govern that territory
and people. 64 Describing this Albanian-Serbian reality in both a historical
and present context, international law scholar Professor Zejnullah Gruda
wrote:
Lenin claims that nations separate only when national oppression and
friction make joint life absolutely unbearable. According to him denial of
the right to self-determination and separation of nations is nothing other
nation and police
than an attempt to protect the privileges of the ruling
65
methods of government instead of democratic ones.
Kosovo and her people were forcibly kept under Yugoslav rule, in particular under Serbian jurisdiction, while lacking the strength to achieve liberation. Moreover, the international community was not ready to support
them. The moment Kosovo gathered the strength to break away and the
will of the international community to support her rose, she left the Serbian
jurisdiction.
The right to self-determination for a compact territory such as Kosovo,
where over 90% of the population desires independence, is not only a natural right on ethnic grounds, but also a democratic right supported by posi-

63. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 5, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 226; SOCIALIST AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KOSOVO
CONST. art. 3, translated in HELSINKI COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, KOSOVA: LAW AND
POLITICS, Kosovo IN NORMATIVE ACTS BEFORE AND AFTER 1974, at 41 (1998).

64. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE Ch. 25, § 8 (A.C. Campbell trans,
1901) (1625) (rulers who "provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can
no longer claim the privilege of the law of nations."); Gruda, supra note 7, at 33.

65. Gruda, supra note 7, at 8.
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tive international acts. The Kosovar Albanians' insistence on independence
is based on the democratic principle of the majority and on the fact that
66
Albanians have been in that land for over a millennium.
The Albanian people of Kosovo have shown in numerous ways that
their will is to separate from Serbia and to be independent. They have expressed this most strongly via the armed struggle where they proved their
desire for independence, despite possible sacrifices, because they consider
that life in Serbia would be the greatest sacrifice of all. The national,
demographic, and territorial reality of the Albanian people of Kosovo; their
historical and geographical individuality; and their national structures
based on strong democratic will, the principles of equality, and the right to
express free will, are all reasonable grounds for the right of the people of
Kosovo to self-determination, freedom, and independence. Above all, there
is the shared history of a river of blood between these two peoples, and no
moral or democratic right could demand that Kosovo and the Albanians
should repeat a savage and bloody history. Sound reasoning, in harmony
with the principles of modem democracy and the will of the people of Kosovo, underlies the position that there must not be a return to the suffering,
tragedies, massacres, and hatred that already have occurred several times in
history. A return to Serbian jurisdiction not only would accompany a return
to the horrors touched on above, but also would be accompanied by the
culpability of those who turned their backs. Finally, as Beyamin Neuberger
writes, "[a] major argument for secession is based on the notion that a people who did not consent to be included in a particular state has the moral
right to decide by itself and for itself whether it wants to stay within the
67
imposed boundaries."
IV.

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BASES FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE
STANDPOINT OF REGIONAL SECURITY

In their struggle for self-determination and independence, the Kosovars also must bear in mind the interests of the international community in
safeguarding peace and security, as well as any rights issuing from acts of
the U.N. Today it is well known that the question of Kosovo is a matter of
great tension, which could determine whether there is peace or war in the
Balkans and elsewhere. After several years of the status quo, during the last
two years the Kosovo crisis has entered the most critical stage-that of
war. This is the result of many factors. Kosovo in recent years has become
66. Zimmermann, supra note 34, at 5.
67. Benyamin Neuberger, National Self-Determination: Dilemmas of a Concept, I NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 297, 313 (1995).
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an important matter for the security and stability of the Southern Balkans,
as well as an important matter for the credibility of European security, as
there is always a possibility for the spread of this type of conflict in South
68
Eastern Europe.
The importance of Kosovo for peace and stability in the region is evident from her geostrategic position. This has been true practically throughout history. At the end of the last century, Serbian geographer and
ethnologist Jovan Cvijic concluded from observing a map of the Balkan
Peninsula: "[w]hoever controls Kosovo controls not only Serbia but also
the whole central region of the Balkans. '69 Cvijic's opinions on the importance of Kosovo for Serbia's geopolitics decisively influenced the Serbian
national programmes during the last part of the nineteenth century and
later.
The Kosovo crisis in the 1990s assumed international dimensions for
several reasons. This was observed by native and foreign authors, as well
as by Serbian ones. According to Serbian author Ljubivoje Acimovic, this
happened for human rights reasons and the need to safeguard peace and
70
international security.
The international consensus since the end of the Cold War has been
that independence for Kosovo would endanger peace and security in the
region. The many arguments for not recognizing Kosovo's right to selfdetermination were bolstered by the need to maintain stability in the region,
especially in view of the danger to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Viewed from a formal legal angle, a decision by the Kosovar Albanians to establish an independent sovereign state, based on the results of
the 1991 referendum, does not allow any individual or subject to decide or
demand any other solution. The same also applies to smaller demands.
Even the Kosovo people's liberation war itself showed that they were aiming for Kosovo as an independent state-nothing more, nothing less. The
war showed more clearly than anything else that Kosovo endangers peace
and security if it remains under occupation, while it does not endanger
peace and security if it becomes independent.
The late academic Gazmend Zajmi, referring to the claim that Kosovar
independence would be a destabilizing factor, astutely observed:

68. Jansuz Bugajski, Kosova Between War and Independence: Implicationsfor International
Security, BALKAN ANALYST, Jan.-Mar. 1999, at 5-6.
69. Jorgo Samakos, Athens Discovers the Secrets of the Kosovo War, FAKTI [THE FACT], Skopje
Dec. 24, 1998, at 10.
70.
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[U]nder cover of safeguarding regional stability, full independence of
Kosovo may be postponed for a while, but it would be hard for the Kosovo question to be eliminated in this regard, as an essentially democratic
and balanced solution in the Balkans. Its prolongation implies
the con71
tinuation of conflict and interethnic tensions in the Balkans.
A long-term and stable solution to the Kosovo question cannot be
linked only to its definition as an "oasis of peace"; it also must be linked to
justice. Peace has no meaning without justice, for such an imposed peace is
fragile.
The Albanian people of Kosovo now seek only the right to take possession of their own country in the Balkans and to live free and in harmony
with their neighbors. It is essential that this matter penetrates the consciousness of the Serbian people as well. As many authors stress, the separation of Kosovo from Serbia would also help Serbia to prosper and
democratize. As Noel Malcolm wrote: "[w]hen ordinary Serbs learn to
think more rationally and humanely about Kosovo, and more critically
about some of their national myths, all the people of Kosovo and Serbia
will benefit-not least the Serbs themselves. '72
At the time of the Hundred Years' War between France and England,
Jean d'Arc said, "[a]s to Peace with the English ... the only way possible
is that they go back to their country in England." 73 Regarding the Kosovar
Albanians' right to self-determination, this legal maxim is relevant: qui iure
suo utitur neminfacit iniuram (he who uses his own right does harm to no
one).
The recent events in Kosovo-the fierce struggle for independence;
the sufferings, massacres, and tragedies; and indeed the intervention of
NATO-all favor the argument that Kosovo's independence would increase stability. The achievement of full independence in Kosovo would
promote peace in the region, without violence or tragedy. The NATO humanitarian mission itself would be accomplished and upheld as an example
of the international community focusing on achieving permanent stability,
uninfluenced by politics and history.
On the importance of achieving the right to self-determination amid
regional stability, the Serbian academic Dobrica Cosic, who is regarded as
the father of the Serbian nation, said, "[s]elf-determination is the first prin74
ciple of any democratic solution."

71. ZmMI, supra note 22, at 180.
72. MALCOLM, supranote 1, at 356.
73. BERNARD JOSEPH, NATIONALITY: ITS NATURE AND PROBLEMS 190 (1929).
74. Gruda, supra note 7, at 20 (this statement of Cosic is taken from BORBA [Belgrade daily
newspaper] Mar. 20-21, 1993).
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION ON THE FINAL STATUS OF

Kosovo
Justice demands that the international community view Kosovo from a
factual standpoint and not just from a legal standpoint. Kosovo, as do many
other countries, holds a unique status in international law. The effective
exercise of power in Kosovo depends on the U.N. and on the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government. It does not at all depend on the state that
formally retained sovereignty over this territory and people. Such internal
power is exercised because, on an international level, achieving legal status
and legal rights is often pursued by taking the first tangible steps down that
road. From this viewpoint, effective self-governance demonstrates the ability to possess that right and to meet legal obligations.
The efficient exercise of power in a territory over a population influences international theory and practice. Several authors, since the creation
of the first modem states, have attributed great importance to efficiency,
often demanding as an essential condition that it precede the legal side of
things. According to Groci, efficiency plays an important role as a common
thread among international law subjects. 75 Groci maintained that suitability
76
is decided by efficiency; the reverse would mean endless disputes.
In this case this approach is positive for Kosovo, because efficient
self-governance already exists. The path Kosovo chose was not without
risk in the sense that when actual changes precede statutory ones, possibly
in opposition to international law, the international community may not
support such a fait accompli. In fact, a change in the actual situation that
under international law is a violation of legal statutory rights may prompt
and justify international involvement and the use of force, bringing instability. Therefore, statutory rights should be respected before accounting for
the actual situation. 77 Changes to the actual situation must be made only
based on a legitimate right to an independent sovereign state according to
the criteria of international law.
In Kosovo, the right to an independent sovereign state exists under international law, and the actual situation involves the exercise of effective
power according to international criteria. International approval of the actual situation would bridge the gap between reality and formal justice, in
78
service to international theory and practice.

75. Zajmi, supra note 22, at 182.
76. Id.
77. See HUDELIST, supra note 24, at 53.
78. See id at 54.
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Examining more closely whether approving the actual situation in
Kosovo was achieved according to international standards, in international
theory some argue that efficiency must satisfy two conditions: efficiency
must be created with rights and obligations according to international law,
and efficiency must extend to international relations. Rights and obligations
are part of the structure of leadership in Kosovo. The U.N. exercises supreme authority in Kosovo; it is the international mechanism that seeks the
fulfillment of these conditions. Thus, the U.N. holds a unique mandate by
possessing the authority to evaluate conditions in Kosovo that the U.N.
itself helped satisfy.
It is debatable whether statehood should be gained only when full efficiency is achieved. Traditionally, there could be statutory rights even if this
precondition is not satisfied. However, in the case of Kosovo, her efficiency created an opportunity for her to be competent in the field of international relations, which is a second condition of statehood in modem
times.
Kosovo fulfils all the traditional criteria for being a state. It is well
known that the traditional criteria for being a state are: the possession of a
permanent population and territory, the exercise of sovereignty, 79 and the
ability to form international relations. There is no question Kosovo comprises a unique population in a specific territory. But two specific conditions are required to satisfy this criterion: first, an intention to live
permanently in that territory, and second, the territory sought must be habitable. There is no question the citizens of Kosovo wish to live permanently
where they are and that the territory is habitable.
Statehood logically requires a definition of external borders. During
her history under Serbia and the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo's territory was
defined by the 1974 Constitution of the FSRY. 80 According to international
theory and practice, those borders need not be uncontestable by neighboring states. So it was with many states after the First World War, as well as
with Albania during the declaration and recognition of her own independence. But Kosovo still must make clear the external borders of the territory
it intends to claim. 8 1 It is quite clear that Kosovo requested a defined territory and, in a symbolic sense, has represented that territory in postwar institutions, where the map of Kosovo may be seen.

79. 1 L_ OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 118 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
80. See SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. arts. 1-5, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 225-26.
81. Malcolm N. Shaw, Territory in InternationalLaw, 13 NETH. Y.B. INT'L LAW 61 (1982).
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The exercise of sovereignty is one of the conditions for being a state.
To put it differently, a state must have a government. Although the requisite form of government is not precisely defined by international theory and
practice, it must include the people's right to self-determination. The government also must fulfill two criteria: first, it must be politically institutionalized as an executive and administrative operation aimed at regulating
relations in society, and second, it must effectively exercise state authority
over the territory and people.8 2 Kosovo has a democratic government that
was chosen by her citizens via elections organized and supervised by the
OSCE, U.N., EU and other international bodies. The government functions
through legal acts based on a constitutional framework and through laws
passed by the legislative organs, which have been approved by the Special
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General. NATO enforces laws relating to international security, and U.N. police forces enforce laws relating to
internal law and order. The judicial system operates under the control of
UNMIK, utilizing international judges and prosecutors. Every institution of
Kosovo has an international component.
The Government of Kosovo is still under the tutelage of the U.N.
There are many powers it does not itself exercise, which are assumed by
the international community. This is a good basis for creating a state structure. Kosovo is building its government according to international standards. The gradual transfer of powers will help ensure success. The process
has the advantage that a government with a coherent political structure
based on a legitimate title to exercise authority over its territory and populace already satisfies contemporary international law criteria for statehood,
even before a more sophisticated administration exists to exercise full
83
authority.
Kosovo has not yet created international relations and has not undertaken diplomatic missions. According to existing laws, the representatives
of the U.N. have the right to create international relations for Kosovo, thus
hindering Kosovo's own attempts in this area. However, the prevailing
opinion in the field of international law suggests Kosovo's entry into international relations on its own is not so indispensable as to require tabling its
request for statehood. There will need to be machinery in place so that
Kosovo is able and legally authorized to form agreements and to represent
itself.8 4 Given the structural progress Kosovo already has made with the
assistance of the international community, there is no dilemma concerning
82. See I OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 118.
83. See Shaw, supra note 81.
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whether Kosovo is ready to create its own competent diplomatic
machinery.
Recognizing Kosovo at this stage would be normal procedure according to international theory and practice. There are countries not meeting
these criteria, especially that of efficiency, which nevertheless have been
recognized-for example, Croatia and Georgia. The very act of intemational recognition has enabled those states to exercise effective control in
their territory. Kosovo could have done this had it been recognized earlier
than 1998 (the time of formal declarations that it was an independent sovereign state). Instead, NATO forces had to intervene in Kosovo to sever
Serbia's control, at which point control passed to the international community and representatives from Kosovo.
The case of Kosovo comports with the opinion of some theoreticians
that formal and actual independence should be bilateral. 85 But according to
constitutionalists and declarationists, the formation of states happens first
as a matter of fact and second as a matter of international law. 86 Under this
view, the recognition of Kosovo is a subsequent legal act that must follow
the formation that already clearly has happened as a matter of fact. The
international community's direct aid to Kosovo accomplished that fact.
Formal recognition of Kosovo's independence should now follow its
declaration of independence in order to guarantee universal acceptance of
Kosovo's existence. A state without legal effect is not a state in the context
of international law, which context is indispensable in a time of interdependence and globalism. 87 Kosovo satisfies both the traditional criteria for
statehood, which stem from efficiency, and the modem criteria for statehood, which stem from legal status.
At the time of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and in particular the fall of communism in general, one of the international community's
conditions for recognition of new states was respect for the rights of minorities. The rights of minorities in modem times are seen as norma jus
cogens. Such rights were not respected in the FSRY, but they are respected
in Kosovo now. Under legal acts in Kosovo, minorities possess rights often
as extensive as those of the majority, including, inter alia, language, representation, culture, and schooling. This is seen in the laws approved by the
organs of Kosovo, in part due to the demands of the international commu-
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nity because the SRSG holds the exclusive right to protect minorities. 88 In
addition, Kosovo's Constitutional Framework incorporated many international conventions regarding minority rights. 89
Recognition of the right of self-determination is legally connected to
the right to statehood. Political self-determination in all situations is a sine
qua non for the effective exercise of power, defense, and development and
for the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural self-determination. 90
Full recognition of the right to self-determination can compensate for a lack
of full efficiency toward affecting statehood in international law.
CONCLUSION

Great legal, political, strategic, and security arguments weigh in favor
of self-determination for the Albanians and Kosovo. The right to selfdetermination of Albanians and Kosovo is in general accord with the free
will of the majority people, is in agreement with democratic principles, and
would work to the advantage of peace and stability in the region. This right
is particularly rooted in the moral claim of the people of Kosovo and was
never held by the Serbian regime, especially after all the violence
unleashed during its years of occupation of Kosovo, which grew especially
savage toward the end. Self-determination for the people of Kosovo would
be the fulfillment of a natural, historic, demographic, legal, and democratic
right, and above all would answer the centuries-long sufferings of this
country and this people at the same time as it would build new prospects
for them and the region as a whole.

88. Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doe. UNMIKREG/2001/9 ch. 8 (May 15, 2001), available at

http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework htm
89. Id. at pmbl., ch. 3.
90. Jan Klabbers & Ren6 Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self-Determinationand Uti Possidetis, in
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-42 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993).

